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The European Union's New Ambitions, ASIL's 99th Meeting, April 2, 2005 
Europe’s Emerging Constitution 
Francesca Bignami   
 The rise of a new constitutional order in the European Union will have profound 
consequences for international law.  It is true, as Per Lachmann has just observed, that 
Europeans have multilateralism in their blood.  But we can also expect that the 
emergence of the European Union as a liberal democracy will sometimes frustrate 
multilateralism and international cooperation.  This contribution outlines the 
constitutional transformation that has been under way since the early 1990s; it then 
explores this transformation’s  possible impact on external relations by examining the 
recent EU-U.S. dispute over privacy safeguards for airline passenger data. 
* * * 
 Today, the European Union is a federal union—albeit a sui generis one—that 
adheres to the basic principles of liberal democracy.  Less than fifteen years ago, it was 
still an international organization.  A number of institutional reforms have contributed to 
this constitutional transformation.   
First, legislative powers are no longer exercised by the European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers alone.  The directly elected assembly, the European Parliament, 
also decides.  This ―co-decision,‖ which gives the Council and the Parliament the power 
to approve legislative proposals, was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and has 
since been extended to a variety of policy areas.  Under the Constitutional Treaty of 
2004, which still awaits ratification, co-decision would  apply even more widely, 
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although that somewhat esoteric term would be changed to the more apt "ordinary 
legislative process."  This steady expansion of Parliament's internal powers increases 
Parliament's influence over external relations dramatically since any international 
agreement entailing an amendment of an act adopted under co-decision must obtain the 
assent of the Parliament before it can be concluded.
1
   
The impact of parliamentary empowerment on European politics is best 
appreciated if the Parliament is seen to act in a separation-of-powers—not a 
parliamentary—system of government.  In other words, members of parliament are 
selected independently of the public officials responsible for the other two main 
legislative bodies (the Commission and the Council of Ministers).  Parliamentarians do 
not control the other participants in the legislative process, nor are parliamentarians' 
choices dictated by those other participants.  Consequently, parliamentary empowerment 
will pluralize the European system of government even further, and it will bring to the 
European Union the kind of competition between the legislative and executive branches 
to which we, in the United States, are accustomed.  
Second, today, not only how the European Union decides but what it decides 
bears a strong resemblance to national government.  Responsibility (competence) for a 
wide array of non-internal market policies has been transferred to the European Union.  
Until 1986, the European legislator was limited, with few exceptions, to action promoting 
the common market and the four freedoms:  free movement of goods, workers, capital, 
and services (including freedom of establishment).  Today, because of  additional 
competences in the governing treaties, legislation is being issued in areas such as civil 
justice, social policy, and the environment.  The expansion of competences is even more 
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dramatic if the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal Matters are counted.  This transfer of competences is especially 
significant for European citizens because European institutions decide more matters and  
matters of greater consequence—not merely economic questions relating to the common 
market but questions relating to values and lifestyle choices.  As Pieter Jan Kuijper and 
Per Lachmann explain, this change will require that states in the international system deal 
increasingly with the European Union—not with individual European states. 
Third, because of these extensive powers, the European Union today possesses a 
highly symbolic catalogue of fundamental rights:  the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union.  The Charter was signed by the Council, Commission, and 
Parliament in 2000, and it has been incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty (and 
therefore would also become formally binding and legally enforceable upon ratification).  
These are rights European citizens can invoke against the decisions of European 
institutions; they are also rights European institutions have a duty to promote.  In the 
European Union, fundamental rights operate as a shield against government action 
(enforceable in the courts) and as a set of entitlements to such action (generally not 
enforceable in the courts but invoked routinely in political life outside the judicial 
branch). 
The European Union of 2005 is thus a liberal democracy.  This characterization 
will remain true even if the Constitutional Treaty fails to be ratified in upcoming national 
referendums.  What are the implications of the European Union's new constitutional 
order?  What, in particular, are the implications for politics and lawmaking in the 
international realm?  The attribution of government powers to a directly elected 
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legislature that can decide issues of great importance and that does so to further 
fundamental rights carries the potential for discord in international relations.  Many 
issues once decided by civil servants in the European Commission and supervised by 
civil servants in trade ministries of the Member States must today be approved by directly 
elected European parliamentarians.  Thus another set of public officials must now be 
satisfied with the results of negotiations, and these newcomers answer directly to diverse 
sets of voters and political parties.  Moreover, although such decisions were once 
perceived as merely technical and regulatory, today they are framed as fundamental value 
choices that affect all European citizens and that, consequently, deserve their attention.  
So the rise of democratic politics might very well operate as a source of friction in EU 
foreign relations.  
* * * 
 The recent dispute over transfers of European airline passenger data to the United 
States for anti-terrorism purposes illustrates some possible consequences of the new 
European politics for international law.  The long history of the U.S.–EU relationship 
starts with the Marshall Plan and the Truman administration’s support for a federal 
Europe.  For most of the post-war period, however, the United States engaged in political 
dialogue and treaty-making with individual European states, not with the European Union 
as a whole.  That changed in 1990.  Bush Sr.’s ―Transatlantic Declaration‖ and then 
Clinton’s  ―New Transatlantic Agenda‖ prompted a series of high-level bilateral 
meetings, which resulted in a number of EU-U.S. agreements.  Among the most 
significant ones were the Mutual Recognition Agreement on product certification, the 
Customs Cooperation Agreement, and two agreements on anti-trust enforcement.  On the 
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European side of these negotiations, the Commission and the Council dominated; the 
Parliament's role was marginal. 
Recently, however, the European Parliament has insisted that it too should have a 
say in transatlantic relations.  Under the EU Data Protection Directive, personal 
information may be transferred abroad only if the destination country ―ensures an 
adequate level of protection‖ for the privacy of such information.  But in the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government began demanding access 
to passenger information kept by European airlines (Passenger Name Records or PNR) 
before their planes landed in the United States.  It was clear to all concerned that U.S. law 
on information privacy did not afford an ―adequate level of protection‖:  few limits are 
set on the purposes for which the U.S. government may use personal information; many 
types of personal information may be transferred freely among government agencies; 
and, once collected, personal information may be stored and used indefinitely, without 
any time limitations.  Thus, airlines flying between the European Union and the United 
States were put in a bind:  if they complied with U.S. demands, they could be prosecuted 
by European authorities for breaking the Data Protection Directive; if European airlines 
failed to comply, on arrival in the United States, they faced extensive delays, intrusive 
passenger searches, and fines. 
In December 2003, after almost a year of intensive negotiations, the European 
Commission and the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection reached a tentative 
agreement.  Under the PNR agreement, the U.S. government committed to a number of 
privacy safeguards, and the European Union agreed to recognize that U.S. law afforded 
an ―adequate level of protection‖ for European passenger data.  The Council approved the 
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agreement on May 17, 2004.  But throughout the negotiations, the European Parliament 
had been highly critical of the concessions being made by the Commission and, shortly 
before the agreement was to come into force, the Parliament brought a challenge in the 
European Court of Justice seeking to have it declared unlawful.  Notwithstanding the 
pending lawsuit, the agreement entered into force on May 28, 2004. 
In the Parliament’s lawsuit, the impact of Europe’s new constitutional order on 
foreign affairs is articulated with extreme clarity.  First, the Parliament claims that 
because it had the power of co-decision over the internal Data Protection Directive, it 
also has the power of assent over international agreements in the privacy field.  
According to the Parliament, the PNR agreement alters the terms of the Data Protection 
Directive—by finding that U.S. law affords an ―adequate level of protection‖ when, 
allegedly, it fails to do so; therefore the Council should have obtained Parliament's assent.  
Second, the Parliament claims that the PNR agreement violates the fundamental 
European right to privacy as set down in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and the case law of both the 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. 
The case will be decided in spring of  2006.  If the Court of Justice holds in favor 
of the European Parliament, democratic politics will have succeeded in stymieing 
tranatlantic cooperation.  Even if the Parliament loses—if the Court finds the agreement 
does not alter the terms of the Data Protection Directive or breach the fundamental right 
to privacy—the lawsuit will serve as a warning to the Commission and the Council.  In 
international treaty negotiations, the Commission and the Council will have to pay 
careful attention to the demands of European parliamentarians if the results (arguably) 
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alter the terms of existing European legislation adopted by co-decision or undermine 
fundamental rights.  
 With the PNR dispute, all three elements of the European Union’s new 
constitutional order come together to frustrate international relations and treatymaking.  
The Data Protection Directive, adopted through co-decision, was passed to facilitate the 
free flow of personal data in intra-European trade.  Now that the Commission and the 
Council wish to act internationally on the privacy issue, they must also accommodate the 
views of the  European Parliament.  Accommodation might not always be possible; even 
if it is, accommodation may alter the nature of the bargain with third countries.  
Moreover, although both the internal legislation and the external PNR agreement are 
designed to promote trade, they do so out of a concern for privacy and the potential for 
national differences over privacy to disrupt trade.  Hence, Parliament’s interest in the 
PNR issue indicates that, in the future, it will be active on other, non-economic foreign 
relations matters.  Framing privacy as a ―fundamental right‖ since the adoption of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, renders the issue—and negotiations with third countries 
on the issue—even more salient in the eyes of European parliamentarians and their 
voters.  
 The United States and other countries that engage with the European Union in the 
international sphere should take this dispute over privacy as a harbinger of things to 
come.  Democratic politics at the European level will, in all likelihood, serve as a source 
of friction in international relations.  For some, this is a welcome development.  Not only 
will parliamentarians and their voters benefit, but an active European Parliament might 
serve as an additional source of bargaining power for the European Commission when it 
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negotiates with third countries.  But for states in the international system that must deal 
with the European Union, the new European politics is likely to cause not a little 
frustration. 
